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Abstract: Suffering from high rates of inflation since the 1940s and having experienced 
two hyperinflations at the end of the 1980s, in 2019 Argentina faced an increase of prices 
of more than 50%. But in the 1990s Argentina achieved price stability and growth at once. 
What were the sources of such an immediate change? What lessons can be drawn from this 
experience? As in the 1990s Argentina adopted profound market reforms, stability could 
be considered an achievement of neoliberal diffusion. Not only international forces were 
propelling change; the International Monetary Found (IMF) celebrated the success and 
invited other emerging nations to imitate it. Nevertheless, this perspective underestimates 
the importance of the local context in the history of neoliberal reforms and overestimates 
the coherence of external forces. Through the analysis of testimonies of Argentine and 
foreign officials and the study of declassified documents from the IMF, this paper argues 
that stability was only achieved after the adoption of a currency board, which was against 
the recommendation of most foreign officials. Instead of a simple top-down transposition 
of ideas, the Argentinian case reveals the importance of the agency of technocrats. Their 
local innovation not only made the diffusion of neoliberalism possible, but it also turned 
the currency board into one of the global anti-inflationist recipes recommended to other 
countries, despite its heavy consequences.
Keywords: neoliberalism; currency board; technocrats; Argentina; IMF. 
Resumo: Sofrendo de altas taxas de inflação desde a década de 1940 e tendo experimen-
tado duas hiperinflações no final da década de 1980, a Argentina enfrentou em 2019 
um aumento de preços de mais de 50%. Mas na década de 1990 a Argentina alcançou 
ao mesmo tempo estabilidade de preços e crescimento. Quais foram as fontes de tal 
mudança imediata? Que lições podem ser tiradas dessa experiência? Como na década 
de 1990 a Argentina adotou profundas reformas de mercado, a estabilidade pode ser 
considerada uma conquista da difusão neoliberal. As forças internacionais não foram as 
únicas forças motrizes para a mudança, pois o Fundo Monetário Internacional (FMI) 
comemorou o sucesso e convidou outras nações emergentes a imitá-lo. No entanto, essa 
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Introduction
Considered an ineluctable effect of growth in 
emerging economies in the postwar years, inflation has 
become an endangered species in the economic landscape. 
In most developed countries inflation rates remained 
relatively low after the Second World War and were 
successfully controlled and later reduced after the oil 
crises’ impact of the 1970s. On the contrary, in emerging 
countries inflation was higher but accepted as a side effect 
of development until it climbed into three or four digits 
in the late 1970s and 1980s, encouraging deep reforms. 
Since then, most Latin American countries have left this 
experience behind and preserved stability.
This is not the case of Argentina. Suffering from 
high rates of inflation since the 1940s and having expe-
rienced two hyperinflations at the end of the 1980s, this 
country dealt in 2019 with an increase of prices of more 
than 50%. In view of this long-lasting phenomenon, 
the exception astonishes: in the 1990s, as most of its 
neighbors, Argentina achieved prices stability and eco-
nomic growth at once. What were the sources of such an 
immediate change? What lessons can be drawn from it? 
From the policy diffusion perspective, Argentina 
can be regarded as an example of neoliberal diffusion, 
and supposedly there would be a strong relation between 
international mandates, market reforms and stability. 
Actually, in the 1990s Argentina adopted profound 
market reforms in a short period of time and within a 
democratic regime. Public companies were privatized 
while the government opened commercial and financial 
markets and eliminated most state regulations. From this 
perspective, the experience of the 1990s could show the 
path to solve Argentinian economic instability today. Not 
only the international community becomes a driving force 
for change. As in those circumstances, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) could be regarded as a good ad-
visor and monitor of domestic public policy. Once again, 
Argentina should make its institutions converge with 
those prevailing abroad. 
But the understanding of political economy deci-
sions is complex and public policy still has a lot to learn 
from the origins of local neoliberal experiences. The issue 
has been approached from different angles. On the one 
hand, many case studies have analyzed the importance of 
domestic conditions for any change. Inflation in Argentina 
is only one of the identified opportunities for the adop-
tion of profound reforms, as have been the crises of state 
interventionism, the recrudescence of political struggles 
and other severe economic disorders3. On the other hand, 
many researchers have stressed the effect of global forces 
in the spread of neoliberalism: economic ideas, capital 
flows, trade agreements and communication technologies4. 
These conditions were certainly crucial for the adoption of 
neoliberal policies. Finally, different paths to neoliberalism 
have been systematically compared5. 
Regarding the interaction between local and global 
forces, two pieces of literature turned it into the focus of 
their analyses. While diffusion analysts associated neolib-
eralism with other policy innovations and identified a set 
of mechanisms through which diffusion occurs (Henisz 
et al., 2005; Simmons et al., 2008; Simmons & Elkins, 
2004; Weyland, 2005; Shipan & Volden, 2008), scholars 
interested in international organizations have stressed 
perspectiva subestima a importância do contexto local na história das reformas neolib-
erais e superestima a coerência das forças externas. Por meio da análise de intervenções 
de autoridades argentinas e estrangeiras e do estudo de documentos desclassificados do 
FMI, este trabalho argumenta que a estabilidade só foi atingida após a adoção de uma 
caixa de conversão, o que contrariava a maioria das recomendações estrangeiras. Em 
vez de uma simples transposição de ideias de cima para baixo, o caso argentino revela a 
importância da agência dos tecnocratas. Sua inovação local não só possibilitou a difusão 
do neoliberalismo, mas também transformou a caixa de conversão em uma das receitas 
anti-inflacionistas globais recomendadas a outros países, apesar de suas significativas 
consequências.
Palavras-chave: neoliberalismo; caixa de conversão; tecnocratas; Argentina; FMI.
3 Among the case analyses of neoliberalism, the analyses of Chile by Silva (2008), of Mexico by Centeno (1994) or of the Anglo-Saxon countries by Harvey (2005) are just a few 
of many examples. For Argentina, see Gerchunoff & Torre (1998).
4 About these external forces, see Mirowski & Dieter (2009); Doyle (2010); Kaufman (1988); Latham & Sassen (2005); Lee Mudge (2008); Jessop (2012); Knorr Cetina & Preda 
(2006); Zaloom (2006). For their consideration in the Argentinian case, Morresi (2007).
5 This strategy, developed early in Latin America (Etchemendy, 2011; Smith, Acuña & Gamarra, 1994; Stokes, 2001; Teichman, 2002; Torre, 1998; Weyland, 2002) and later 
in Eastern Europe (Jacoby, 2006; Stone, 2002), was adopted to compare nations in the developed world (Blyth, 2002; Prasad, 2006). Some scholars questioned this division, 
identifying common patterns irrespectively of the level of economic development or region (Fourcade-Gourrinchas & Babb, 2002; Heredia & Kirtchik, 2010; Nelson, 1990).
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that “policies are formed and institutionalized by the way 
of traveling” (Chorev, 2009, p. 132). These analyses have 
provided critical insights for the study of policymaking. 
First, they placed recent transformations in the context 
of the longer history of emulation, coercion, learning and 
competition among different states. Second, the study of 
institutional mediators offers an observational vantage 
point to see how policies are shaped and reshaped by 
the process through which they are translated from one 
country to next. 
In spite of this, certain assumptions persist. 
Frequently, neoliberalism tends to be interpreted as the 
result of a transfer of global “economic” ideas or pres-
sures, nuanced by certain local “political” particularities. 
While unity, premeditation, and efficacy are ascribed to 
external “economic” forces, diversity, bewilderment, and 
incompetence or impotency characterize local “political” 
counterparts. Neoliberal policies tend to be considered 
as coherent and closed packages to be transported from 
an external starting point into distant locales; researchers 
tend to identify only one prevailing diffusion mecha-
nism mediating temporal and geographical settings. On 
this basis, these perspectives tend to underestimate the 
importance of local contexts in the history of neoliberal 
reforms and overestimate the coherence of external forces. 
As noted, neoliberalism is a plural rather than a unique 
process (Puello-Socarrás, 2013, p. 27).
Through the analyses of testimonies of Argen-
tine and foreign officials and the study of declassified 
documents from the IMF, this paper argues that neo-
liberal reforms gained legitimacy thanks to the fight 
against inflation, but stability was achieved only after 
the adoption of a currency board, which was against the 
recommendation of most foreign officials. Instead of 
a simple top-down transposition of ideas, Argentinian 
economic policy is a case of technocrats’ agency and policy 
innovation. After its immediate success and thanks to the 
support of international organizations, the Argentinian 
currency board became one of the global anti-inflationist 
recipes recommended to other countries. Focused on the 
stabilization of the macroeconomy, local economists and 
foreign officials neglected both its heavy consequences and 
the threats of its probable end, which were nevertheless 
clearly foreseen in the earlier stages. 
We argue that the agency and embedded reasoning 
of economic experts are missing links that can contribute 
both to diffusion theories and institutional mediators’ 
analyses. The crucial role of economists in internal-exter-
nal coalitions has been already noted: they are frequently 
portrayed as “agents of knowledge” that enable the diffu-
sion and circulation of diagnoses, interests, or pressures 
(Levi-Faur, 2005). While their global integration (through 
socialization, practices and networks) has been very largely 
documented 6, less importance has been given to their 
agency. Thanks to the analyses of Callon (1998), studies 
on sciences and technology revealed the performativity 
of economics. Most of this literature remains focused on 
economists in the developed world and less attention 
is paid to the of economists in the South. According 
to Kaplan (2017, p. :219), even if “technocrats are an 
important transmission mechanism for explaining eco-
nomic policy choices”, they have received little attention. 
The Argentinian case shows that economists’ innovation 
not only made the diffusion of neoliberalism possible, it 
also enacted economic policy on the ground, operating 
within internal and external opportunities and constraints. 
Like Bockman and Eyal (2002), we demonstrate that in 
international dialogue both reformed countries and the 
international organizations are active and thoughtful 
agents, acting in a fragmented and pragmatic manner. 
The inquiry reconstructs the decision-making pro-
cess of economic authorities based on personal accounts7, 
documentary sources8, press data9, and the Minutes of 
the several discussions that took place on the Executive 
Board of the IMF for the approval or reviewing of the 
current Financial Agreements10. Taking into account 
the secrecy surrounding public decision-making and the 
contradictory positions adopted by local and international 
high officials, we triangulated multiple sources and did a 
permanent crosschecking among them. 
The paper is organized in four parts. In the first 
one, we open the black box of neoliberal reforms to dif-
ferentiate structural reforms and anti-inflationist policy. 
We show the importance of inflation to legitimize pro-
found changes as well as the limits of structural reforms 
to achieve stabilization. In the second part, we present 
the arrival of Cavallo’s team to the Ministry of Economy 
and the crafting of the Argentinian currency board, its 
6 Dezalay & Garth (2002); Biglaiser (2009); Fourcade (2009); Montecinos & Markoff (2009).
7 After the crisis of 2001, one of the authors interviewed sixty professional economists in Argentina (scholars, state officials, consultants, journalists), several of whom had a 
direct or indirect intervention in the convertibility decision-making process. We also used the Archivo de Historia Oral of the Germani Institute, where very long interviews with 
high state officials of the period are available. Other personal accounts were consulted in Coiteux (2003).
8 We analyzed reports from the most important local economic think tanks as well as the Minutes of Argentine Parliament discussions.
9 A comprehensive survey of news about economic policy published between 1989 and 1995 by the most important national newspapers – La Nación, Clarín, Ambito Financiero 
– was collected and analyzed.
10 The Minutes reproduce the stenographic version of the debate on the Executive Board when considering the approval and/or renewal of a financing agreement, thus consti-
tuting a primary documentary source of significant importance – and recent access – to account for the interests of a country in relation to a topic under discussion in the IMF 
(Nemiña, 2013). These sources were made public only in 2010, making this research possible (IMF, 2010).
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predecessors and features. In the third part, we analyze 
the resistances and objections of foreign and local econ-
omists to the anti-inflationist plan. In the end, we show 
how the stabilizing effect of convertibility gained the 
endorsement of most foreign and local officials even to 
the point of becoming one of the global anti-inflationist 
recipes recommended to other countries. The dramatic 
social consequences and the tumultuous end of the Ar-
gentinian currency board illustrate both the uniqueness 
of this local innovation and the importance of original 
neglected warnings by experts about it. 
The productive effect of 
hyperinflation and the limits of 
structural reforms
Under the stress of hyperinflation, the Argentin-
ean electorate did not vote on the neoliberal program 
purposefully in the 1989 elections. There were two main 
candidates in the presidential election of 1989. Eduardo 
Angeloz, from the official party blamed for the current 
economic failures, the Unión Cívica Radical, was advised 
by a group of neoliberal economists and promised to un-
dertake with vigor the structural reforms that radicalism 
had previously rejected. It is hard to separate the electoral 
opinion on his platform from his party’s discredit. The 
government’s weakness favored the Peronist candidate, 
Carlos Menem, who was supported by traditional trade 
unions and the most marginalized sectors of the Peronist 
movement. His campaign revolved around a typical an-
ti-elitist style promising a “productive revolution” and a 
“salariazo” (a drastic wage increase). 
Once elected, the Peronist candidate, to everyone’s 
surprise, immediately implemented structural reforms 
(Stokes, 2001). Menem’s “liberal revolution” resulted in 
the enactment of two laws, both passed in 1989: the 
Administrative Reform Act (no. 23696) and the Eco-
nomic Emergency Act (no. 23697). Within this new 
legal framework, privatizations followed with dizzying 
speed11. The state began to reduce public spending and 
the government renounced interventionism, bucking the 
trend of fixing, freezing and controlling prices and salaries. 
This turnaround was rounded off by a new diplomatic 
policy called “peripheral realism” (Escudé, 1997). Menem’s 
government felt that consistent alignment with the US 
was the best strategy to follow. As Menem’s ideological 
shift left his original allies in shock, he recruited traditional 
liberal and neoliberal economists as his main advisors and 
promoters of his agenda. Two factors are fundamental 
to understand the final success of neoliberal reforms in 
Argentina: first, the fact that they were implemented by 
a Peronist leader, using his internal influence and clout 
over unions (Weyland, 2002) and, second, the context of 
inflationary trauma facilitated the appointment of main-
stream economic advisors (Kaplan, 2018).
Even with these two factors at work and the 
far-reaching nature of the economic measures carried out, 
the spiral of inflation did not stop. In spite of the fact that 
the pillars of the Peronist doctrine had been abandoned, 
major structural reforms were already in place and the 
support of the US government was granted, the effort to 
tame inflation failed. Three economic ministers paraded 
through office in one year and by 1990 Argentina was 
experiencing a hyperinflation rate of 2,310%. At the time 
of the presidential elections in May 1989, the dollar was 
worth 100 australes, in November 1989, it climbed to 
1,000, and by December 1990, to almost 10,000. Accord-
ing to opinion polls, the image of the President was falling 
and his party risked losing the next legislative election 
(Clarín, 04/06/91, p. 7). In this context, the government 
sought new approaches to curb inflation, one of which 
was convertibility.
Buenos Aires’ recklessness…
The arrival of Domingo Cavallo, a Harvard trained 
economist, to the Economic Ministry in January 1991 – 
and, in particular, the enactment of the Convertibility Act 
several months later – allowed the government to finally 
stabilize the economy and consolidate the neoliberal order. 
Far from being at the origin of this story, the support of 
the international community and the success of its ulterior 
local allies should be placed at its end.
First appointed as the Foreign Affairs Minister, 
Cavallo seemed to be consistently opposed to using the 
overvalued exchange rate as a means to achieve price sta-
bilization, a solution that was widely discussed in Menem’s 
inner circle12. His position was made explicit in his press 
interventions and justified in a book (Cavallo, 1984). Ac-
cording to interviewees, most members of his professional 
circle were aware of his resistance to dollarization, which, 
by contrast, was promoted by local orthodoxy as a solution 
to inflation (Almansi & Rodríguez, 1989). When a bill 
11 The national telephone company and commercial airline passed to private hands in less than a year. The reduction of tariffs encouraged the opening of the domestic market. 
Transportation was deregulated and regulatory commissions for agricultural and industrial production were eliminated.
12 The oldest Argentine convertibility promoter was Eduardo Curia, who paradoxically became later one of the fiercest opponents of Cavallo and his program (Curia, 1999). On 
the basis of interviews and press analyses, at least two other instigators can be mentioned: the CEMA economists, including Carlos Rodríguez and Ricardo Arriazu, one of the 
initiators of the 1978 plan.
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to fix the exchange rate was discussed before his nomina-
tion, Cavallo was among its main opponents (see Ambito 
Financiero 01/29/91, p. 1, quoted by Ruiz, 2005, p. 198).
However, in the beginning of the 1991, the dollar 
skyrocketed again and put pressure on the inflation rate. 
There were legislative elections that year and, faced with 
the dangerous prospect of growing conflicts and electoral 
defeat, the government chose a drastic approach to stabi-
lize prices (Starr, 1997, p. 109). For that purpose, Cavallo 
took up a currency board13 project that had been designed 
by one of his team members (Roig, 2016). The project was 
consistent with the monetarist approach of the economic 
team and also with the commitment to eliminate the 
monetization of the public sector deficit. 
Was convertibility a complete Argentinian inno-
vation? Not at all, in its pure sense. As a guarantee of low 
inflation, currency boards were used to make trade with 
the metropolis easier during the second half of the 19th 
century and the beginning of the 20th, until the beginning 
of the Great War. From then on, the social and economic 
costs associated to maintaining the gold standard encour-
aged governments to have greater control over exchange 
rate policies. This led to the progressive decay of currency 
boards in several countries and the creation of central 
banks (Walters, 1998). After the fall of the Bretton Woods 
agreements and the advance of the floating exchange rate 
frameworks, by the 1990s less than ten countries around 
the globe had currency boards, and these were all small 
economies, with their trade centralized in very few part-
ners14. Thus, in the early 1990s the currency board seemed 
to the international community to be an old tool, reserved 
for very small and undiversified economies. Convertibility 
was not even unknown in Argentina. Vitelli (2004) says 
that there had been five convertibilities between 1822 and 
1929, and the most long- lasting of them was in force 
between the end of the 19th century and the beginning 
of the Great War, and it coincided with a period when 
prices of raw material peaked. 
These predecessors do not only anticipate the risks 
associated with currency boards but also indicate that 
the Argentinian innovation did not consist in creating 
something brand new but in adjusting and updating 
an anachronistic monetary institution. In fact, the 1991 
Argentinian convertibility was the first to be proposed in 
a context of low commodity prices and financial liberaliza-
tion. Only external financing could maintain it in a context 
of trade deficits and irregular FDI flows (Ponsot, 2003). 
Taking as a starting point the perception that it was 
necessary to offer a shock of confidence to stop speculations 
regarding devaluation of the national currency, the bill postu-
lated the free convertibility of the national currency with the 
American dollar at an equivalent exchange rate. To empha-
size the change at a symbolic level, the name of the national 
currency was changed from austral to peso, taking on the 
historical name of the Argentinean currency. The currency 
also lost four zeros (that is, 10,000 australes converted into 1 
peso). That way, the parity 1 peso/1 dollar was established15.
Far from being an external imposition or the 
result of a complex technical layout, the convertibility 
regime was the response of the local economic authority 
to solve the problem of inflation radically. According to 
their testimonies, the economic team worked under two 
assumptions: first, that financial agents had institution-
alized inflation, so any stabilization program had to use 
the shock effect; second, due to the persistent inflation, 
Argentines had in practice replaced their currency with the 
American dollar: the American currency was used as a unit 
of account and medium of exchange for durable goods. 
Thus, the officials in charge based their interpretations 
on the psychology or subjectivity of Argentines, rather 
than on intrinsic virtues of the model. The IMF executive 
director for Argentina emphasized the existence of an 
“entrenched inflationary psychology” (IMF, 1991a, p. 33), 
while Cavallo spoke of Argentina as a country that “did 
not have a currency” and explained economic fluctuations 
saying that “The Argentinean people are cyclothymic. We 
have a psychological cycle…” (in Liviatán, 1993, p. 37, 51).
Included as a monetary instrument of a broader 
anti-inflationist program centered on fiscal adjustment, 
the new monetary system included a fixed exchange rate 
between the local currency and the dollar, as well as a ban on 
index-based adjustments16. The state was no longer allowed 
to print money without an equal foreign currency reserve 
as a means of financing its deficit or encouraging growth, 
but the regime went even further. From then on, Argentina 
adopted a dual-currency system, meaning that both curren-
cies – the dollar and the peso – could be used equally. The 
economic team ensured that the peso was born as “sound”, 
and for this purpose it should be chosen by the people and 
not imposed by the state; making the dollar circulation 
13 A currency board refers to an exchange rate arrangement in which the exchange rate is fixed to an anchor currency and the Central Bank is not allowed to issue national 
currency unless an equivalent amount of international assets to back it is obtained. This means that the Central Nank is not able to develop an active monetary policy (Walters, 
1998). In the Argentinean case, the exchange rate was pegged by law to the US dollar in a 1 to 1 relation, so it was a hard peg scheme.
14 They were Brunei, Djibouti, Hong Kong, Antigua y Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia and St. Vincent and the Grenadines; the last six ones were mem-
bers of the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (Enoch and Gulde, 1998).
15 The Argentine peso was first legally issued on January 1st 1992, so between April and December 1991 the American dollar could be freely converted into 10,000 australes.
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official serving this purpose (Cavallo, 1996). Argentines 
maintained the right to save, invest, and establish local 
contracts in dollars, and banks could register and contract 
operations in both currencies. This relationship between 
pesos and dollars, established by law, prevented the Central 
Bank from autonomously taking the role of “lender of last 
resort”. In case of a crisis of confidence, national authorities 
could not respond by creating the required currency (the 
dollar). Monetary policy was thus disentangled from the 
national state’s prerogatives and intertwined in foreign 
currency and external capital fluctuation.
Even if it translated into a drastic integration into 
the financial and commercial global flows, Argentina’s 
convertibility included elements that betrayed both the 
orthodox doctrine of currency boards and the command-
ments established by the Washington Consensus (WC). 
Unlike previous experiences, Argentina’s 1991 currency 
board did not abolish the Central Bank and maintained 
some margin for discretion on exchange policies. Although 
the Central Bank adopted the currency board’s criteria, it 
could integrate up to a third of reserves in local sovereign 
bonds denominated in dollars, valued at market prices17. 
Also, there was no maximum ratio of reserves, above 
which they would accumulate without the corresponding 
monetary expansion. Both elements provided a margin to 
sterilize or expand the monetary base in a discretionary way 
(Hanke, 2008; Hanke & Schuler, 2002). On the other hand, 
although according to Ramírez (2013) the convertibility 
was not unconnected to neoliberal debates since it helped 
to constrain the government’s monetary freedom, a currency 
board system with a fixed and appreciated exchange rate 
was against the economic orthodox tide, which favored 
the floating exchange rate schemes that had become pre-
dominant after the fall of the Bretton Woods regime, and 
it deliberately contradicted the Washington Consensus’ 
recommendation for developing countries, which included 
having a floating and depreciated exchange rate in order to 
boost external surplus to facilitate the repayment of foreign 
debts (Williamson, 1990).
…against Washington’s advice
The establishment of an exchange anchor sanc-
tioned by law constituted an economic policy inspired in 
the public choice framework, which, through the promo-
tion of a depolitization of the public administration and 
the limitation of demos, was one of the leading theoretical 
sources of the Virginia School, the most relevant neo-
liberal school of thought in Political Science during the 
nineties (Morresi, 2007; Ramírez, 2013)18.
But notably, at the very beginning Argentina’s 
convertibility was criticized by both foreign and local econ-
omists19. Orthodox economists19 denounced the flexibility 
margin kept by the Central Bank, by pointing out that it was 
in contradiction to the postulates of a pure currency board 
and that it was a source of distrust that could turn against 
the efforts of the authorities. When, during a seminar at 
the World Bank, Cavallo said that having a Chicago boy at 
the Central Bank provided additional confidence in the 
continuity of the currency board, Hanke, a well-known 
and orthodox economist, answered that if Argentina had a 
pure currency board, who was in charge of the Central Bank 
wouldn’t be relevant, since it wouldn’t exist at all (Liviatán, 
1993, p. 50). Heterodox economists20 did not support this 
strategy either, but they stressed other arguments. On the 
one hand, according to them, pegging the local currency 
to the dollar would sooner or later reduce Argentinian 
competitiveness. Open commercial markets would increase 
imports while the country had already trouble to place its 
products abroad. On the other hand, constraints on public 
spending and economic retreat would sooner or later pro-
voke unemployment and poverty. 
As a result, convertibility faced not only resistance 
at an intellectual level but also questionings regarding the 
political support it would receive. Reflecting the political 
and academic consensus about suitable exchange arrange-
ments, many crucial actors at the time demonstrated an 
active resistance to the overvaluation of the local currency 
as a means for stabilization. Convertibility did not have 
any support from largest companies, the IMF or the 
central countries’ governments before its announcement. 
Most local big firms agreed with the structural reforms but 
resisted any exchange rate anchor with the dollar (Beltrán, 
2011; Viguera, 2000; Etchemendy, 2011). 
The IMF authorities were visibly reluctant. The IMF 
expressed doubts based on several grounds. They had been 
traditionally attached to flexible exchange schemes and to 
using free market mechanisms to establish exchange rates 
17 That limit was later reduced to 10%, but it could be increased in times of crisis, which happened during the Tequila crisis and in 2001 (Hanke & Schuler, 2002).
18 Although they shared the basic assumptions, in the field of economics the version of the Chicago School constituted the dominant perspective that informed neoliberal 
thought (Denord, 2002).
19 This refers to economists who agreed with the neoclassical theory and/or those who gave express support to the postulates of the WC in the early 1990s (Dequech, 2007, 
p. 293).
20 Carlos Rodríguez, a referent of the orthodox Center of Macroeconomic Studies of Argentina (CEMA, after its initials in Spanish), warned about the “traps” of convertibility that 
would allow the government to dangerously go into debt. Also, some members of the liberal group of legislators Unión del Centro Democrático (UCEDE) decided to vote against 
convertibility because it did not guarantee a “genuine” fiscal discipline (Ámbito Financiero, 22/3/91, p. 7 and 26/4/91, p. 1).
21 Schvarzer (1996, p. 149-150).
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(Babb, 2007, p. 131). The IMF officials feared that funds 
obtained from privatization would be used to support the 
exchange rate instead of go towards paying Argentine’s debts 
(Bonelli in Clarín, 04/26/91, p. 16), which is what actually 
happened. Finally, they emphasized that the 1 = 1 exchange 
rate was 35% appreciated in relation to the 1990 average, and 
underlined that that could conspire against the sustainability 
of the exchange scheme (IMF, 1991b, p. 20, 34).
For their part, in July 1990, in a meeting of the IMF’s 
Executive Board aimed at approving the new Stand-By 
arrangement, convertibility got a cold reception from the 
directors representing central countries. With the exception 
of the German director, who praised the program and the 
convertible regime, the others showed a cold attitude and 
stressed the possibility of Argentina being capable of reaching 
enough fiscal balance to make projections sustainable. The 
director for Canada, for example, pointed out that “(t)he key 
element of this new program is fiscal restraint. As we are all 
aware, a fixed exchange rate does not in and of itself confer 
credibility” (IMF, 1991c, p. 48).
At the time, Argentina-US diplomatic relations 
faced growing tensions. The US ambassador had accused 
European competitors of paying bribes to Buenos Aires 
authorities to prevent a fair participation of American 
companies in privatizations. President Bush had en-
couraged structural reforms but had not guaranteed any 
financial support for the monetary policy22. For this rea-
son, the IMF director for the USA merely supported the 
agreement, although she said it was important to increase 
the rhythm of debt payments (IMF, 1991a, p. 7)23. The 
directors for Spain and Japan joined the request; the latter 
emphasized his doubts regarding the sustainability of the 
exchange rate24 and the projections of growth and revenues 
(IMF, 1991c, p. 47). Finally, the executive directors for 
Italy, Canada, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands 
joined the Japanese director in his doubts. While the 
latter two picked up on the question of the integration 
of one third of the reserves in sovereign bonds (IMF, 
1991c, p. 53, 56), the Canadian director even suggested 
that it was necessary to design a contingency plan to be 
put into practice if the currency board turned out to be 
unsustainable (IMF, 1991c, p. 50).
Since it did not satisfy internationally established 
canons, neither those of a pure Currency Board nor those 
of the WC, and since it did not have the initial support of 
major foreign and international authorities, convertibility 
cannot be considered a part of an imported economic or-
thodoxy. Once adopted, it wasn’t clear whether those who 
voted for the arrangement at the IMF or locally supported 
the fixed monetary system believed that it would endure 
for a decade, or if they viewed it as a short-term solution 
to economic problems. President Menem, who presented 
himself as an enthusiastic believer in the fixed monetary 
system, insisted on numerous occasions that it would last 
for decades (Clarín, 06/04/91, p. 7), but the opinion of 
experts committed to this measure seems less clear, their 
later testimonies and analyses suggest that they thought 
it would only be in place for a few months. An analysis of 
data from the early 1990s reveals that experts predicted 
that convertibility would have a short life span25. Like most 
heterodox and orthodox groups, Menem’s Economic team 
worried about the social costs and external vulnerability 
caused by convertibility26. 
Global alignment and 
eclecticism for export
Suspicions about convertibility were soon dissi-
pated by its effectiveness. After more than forty years of 
chronic inflation and twenty years bordering on hyperin-
flation, the government had accomplished, in just a few 
months, the stabilization of prices, making Argentina’s in-
flation rate one of the lowest in the world27. This effective 
control coincided with economic growth after more than 
a decade of stagnation. The electorate supported Menem 
by voting for his reelection in 1995. Soon, multiple actors 
wanted to be recognized as precursors, partners or enthu-
siastic adherents of this achievement. 
The Convertibility Plan benefited from the Brady 
Plan after its adoption. Along with other countries, Ar-
gentina ratified an agreement in 1993 that established an 
extension of its debt maturity with a reduction of actual re-
payments28. As a result, states and local commercial banks 
once again had access to foreign financing. Encouraged 
22 Apart from participants’ testimonies, this general support (without financial aid) was publicly quoted and analyzed in the press. Cf. Clarín (04/13/91, p. 11 and 04/12/91, p. 16).
23 Back then, Argentina was slowly mending its external situation, after the 1988 extension; the debt would be definitely renegotiated through the Brady Plan in 1993 (see below).
24 Faced with the insistence on the issue at other meetings later on, the Argentinean director replied that agricultural subsidies in central countries conspired against compet-
itiveness in the local economy. He therefore restricted the debate on the exchange rate to the conclusion of multilateral trade negotiations on this topic (IMF, 1992a, p. 34).
25 In an interview with Coiteux (2003), one of his closest partners, Juan José Llach, affirmed that the economic team was prepared to introduce adjustments but the hostile 
reactions of financial markets and the public opinion prevented them from doing it. The press also shows that the minister foresaw some exchange rate flexibility (Ruiz, 2005, 
p. 210). Nevertheless, by 1993, the minister claimed that parity was “untouchable” and would last “an indeterminate number of years”.
26 Early local consciousness of these probable negative effects can be observed in parliamentary debates and press analyses.
27 Annual inflation dropped from 2314% in 1990 to 24.9% in 1992, and two years later it was in a single digit.
28 The agreement involved the conversion of $ 23 billion of debts with commercial banks (from a total external debt of around $ 65 billion) to par bonds with interest rates 
reduced by two-thirds approximately, or discount with a nominal haircut of 35 %. Banks gave up a third of their claims in exchange for securities collateralized with US Treasury 
bonds. There was an additional reduction of 6 billion dollars by debt-to-equity conversions from the privatization process (Cline, 1995, p. 317).
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by declining interest rates and recessions in major western 
countries, financial flows shifted towards the “emerging 
markets”. Argentina’s inclusion in this list allowed it to 
rely on capital inflows at relatively low interest rates to 
support the state budget imbalances and the economic 
recovery (Santiso, 2003). This was reflected in a visible 
change in the position of the IMF and central countries 
vis-à-vis Argentine convertibility, which went from 
underestimation to recognition and, after the Mexican 
crisis, to acclaim.
In order to prove their support for the process of 
structural transformations, the directors for the United 
States and the United Kingdom expressed several times 
their enthusiasm for Argentine economic decisions. While 
the former pointed out that he expected to be accepted as a 
member of the “Amen Chorus of the Casa Rosada” (IMF, 
1992a, p.: 12), the latter went further and said, expressing 
his impressions after a visit to the country and a meeting 
with the Minister of Economic Affairs: “(T)he secret of 
success in Argentina […] was […] the combination of 
structural reform on the one hand and macroeconomic 
stabilization on the other”. And he added: “He would be 
interested […] on what lessons the Argentine experience 
might have for other countries […]. (W)ith respect to 
macroeconomic policy, whether the shock treatment of a 
currency board arrangement could be repeated in other 
countries and, if so, what were the necessary conditions 
for success” (IMF, 1992a, p. 12-13).
Financial capital inflows threatened to overheat 
the economy, since convertibility forced the Central Bank 
to change it for pesos, with the corresponding increase 
of the monetary base. This created a controversy over 
how to approach the situation, which was taken up in 
several meetings of the IMF Board between 1992 and 
1994. The opinion of the majority, among which France, 
Spain, Italy, the IMF itself and, later, the USA stood out, 
was progressively in favor of the use of “relief valves” that 
originally included increasing reserves above 100% of 
the monetary base, having open market operations and 
increasing banking reserves to avoid a rise of the inflation 
(IMF, 1992a, 1992b, 1994a). 
The Board also discussed economic competitive-
ness. Aligned with the official approach, the majority 
opinion (which included the IMF and practically all of 
the G7 plus Spain) was to maintain convertibility, making 
use of the margin of monetary flexibility considered by 
the law and to go deeper into structural reforms29. Spain 
and Italy admitted that, considering the problem that 
the real appreciation of the exchange rate represented – 
a consequence of fixing a high rate from the beginning, 
plus the persistence of inflation after the establishment 
of convertibility –-, the normal approach would be to 
take advantage of the context of growth to depreciate 
the exchange rate nominally, but since that could have 
awoken recent and traumatic memories, it was best to 
give this up and improve competitiveness with structural 
reforms (IMF, 1993, p. 49, 84). However, Canada and – to 
a lesser extent – the Netherlands were critical. They both 
rekindled their objections to the “relief valves”, pointing 
out that they distorted the currency board. Canada went 
further and insisted on the suggestion that Argentina had 
to devalue and establish a floating exchange rate system, 
as most of the world was using, to regain competitive-
ness (IMF, 1992c, p. 33; 1993, p. 80, 81). Towards 1994, 
the tenacious Canadian opposition was the only critical 
voice against convertibility. It went from being one of the 
instruments of the anti-inflationary shock plan to being 
considered, a few years later, by the US, Italy, Spain and 
France as the core of the economic plan (IMF, 1992c, p. 
23, 34; 1994b, p. 19). Even the USA identified the im-
plementation of convertibility as the initial moment of 
the economic growth in Argentina (IMF, 1994b, p. 15).
The 1994-1995 Mexican crisis was a test for the 
program and its support. Although stabilizing inflation 
at one digit and external and internal approval of the 
economic program led the government to announce that 
they would not renew the agreement with the IMF as a 
sign of strength, the acceleration of capital outflows due 
to the “Tequila Effect” prompted the country to ratify the 
continuity of the agreement and to ask for an increase 
of the available funds of IFIs. Also, authorities took ad-
vantage of the bank run to move forward on the reform 
of the banking sector, which included the privatization 
of several provincial banks and generated a rise in the 
concentration of the sector and the transfer to foreign 
ownership (Bleger, 2000). In the middle of the financial 
crisis, the IMF approved a disbursement of over 1 billion 
dollars. The majority opinion among central countries 
was to support the continuity of the convertibility regime. 
Going against the tide of the generalized consen-
sus, Germany and Canada criticized the continuity. The 
former used a musical metaphor that turned out to be 
prophetic, considering the path that the country followed. 
Germany suggested that convertibility had become a 
dilemma similar to the one in the famous song “Hotel 
California” by The Eagles: “You can check out any time you 
like, but you can never leave” (IMF, 1995a, p. 9). In that 
sense, Germany’s criticism was that if the mere evaluation 
29 The UK put pressure in favor of more fiscal adjustment; the US and Japan, on their part, put pressure in favor of the privatization of the retirement and pensions’ regime, 
which took effect in 1995 (IMF, 1993).
258
Mariana Heredia e Pablo Nemiña
Vol. 25 Nº 2 - Maio/Agosto de 2021
of the continuity promoted distrust, that meant that the 
regime was structurally weak (ibid., p. 54). Some replied 
that such objection should have been exposed earlier, 
and the managing director of the IMF said that they 
had had off-the-record discussions with the authorities 
regarding alternatives. However, they reached a consensus 
that continuity was the most reasonable option given the 
circumstances (IMF, 1995a, p. 55, 56). 
Once Argentina navigated through the crisis, the 
local and external interpretation was that it managed to 
do so thanks to convertibility, not in spite of it. Although 
they disagreed on the effects of the experience for the 
country’s future, Argentine economists granted the fact 
that surviving the Mexican shock had made the convert-
ibility regime stronger. According to Juan José Llach (an 
official close to Domingo Cavallo), “The Tequila crisis 
had a negative effect on a social level because it made 
us believe that we could go on as we did until then, and 
that was a mistake” (in Coiteux, 2003). The general local 
support convinced the IMF and most central countries 
that the convertibility regime was solid and could guar-
antee growth and modernization. And not just that: other 
developing countries began to consider the possibility of 
adopting similar programs. 
The support was also almost unanimous at the 
international level. At the IMF Board meeting by the end 
of 1995, Germany expressed surprise because the report 
mentioned neither the exchange rate nor convertibility, 
and asked rhetorically if by omitting the issue they sought 
to sink it in oblivion (IMF, 1995b, p. 17). The explicit or 
implicit answer provided by the rest of the G7 (except 
Canada) plus Spain and the IMF was that it was not the 
right time to evaluate alternatives and that the exchange 
rate was not a problem, given the improvement of the trade 
balance (IMF, 1995b, p. 13, 34)30. The USA went even 
further and warned that the “currency board regime […] 
perhaps deserves more prominence than it has received” 
(IMF, 1995b, p. 15).
From that moment on, far from being denounced 
as a singular Argentine eclecticism, convertibility became 
a part of the stabilization recipes recommended for strug-
gling economies by international experts (Sgard, 2004). 
Top Argentinean officials and economists promoted the 
adoption of similar systems, especially in former socialist 
republics. For example, in 1996 Cavallo advised the gov-
ernment of Ecuador, in 1998 he traveled to Moscow to 
“export” his program, and another Argentine economist 
participated in a similar experience in Bulgaria. By 1997, 
Estonia, Lithuania, Bulgaria and Bosnia had implemented 
currency board regimes and other countries (e.g. Brazil 
with the Real Plan) advanced in hard pegs schemes 
(Rapoport et al., 2000, p. 978). In that context, even the 
IMF published a specific study on the advantages and 
disadvantages of convertibility, in which it acknowledged 
that currency boards “have undergone a revival”, although 
it only recommended them to small and open economies, 
and those who lacked highly developed financial systems 
(Baliño y Enoch, 1997, p. 1).
Instead of defending the local sources of the 
success of convertibility, Argentinean experts attributed 
them to the alignment of local institutions with the “First 
World”, which international organizations enthusiastically 
accepted. By 1995, the IMF accorded Argentina and 
its experts the status of “best students” in international 
recommendations. The 1995 agreement included a refor-
mulation of the commitments made by Argentina to the 
IMF. Bembi and Nemiña (2007) show in their analyses 
of the IMF Letters of Intent that parity exchange ceased 
to be an “instrument” and became a “guiding principle” 
of economic policy in order to later symbolically absorb 
the structural reforms program under the “Convertibility 
Plan” label. The IMF support was not just symbolic; it 
also included the necessary funds to support the exchange 
parity at Argentina’s disposal. Faced with the delegitimi-
zation due to its failed intervention in the financial crisis 
in Southeast Asia, Argentina appeared to the IMF as a 
successful case to offer the world. 
Concluding remarks
This article analyzes the work performed by local 
and foreign economic authorities along Argentina’s path to 
neoliberalism and stresses their crucial role as links between 
local and international forces, highlighting their actions 
in light of the opportunities and constraints they faced at 
both levels. The diffusion literature has identified struc-
tural reforms such as trade liberalization, the deregulation 
of markets, and privatization as the core components of 
worldwide neoliberal reforms, associating their widespread 
adoption to global promoters and international institution-
al mediators. Our research complements these findings 
by paying particular attention to the implementation of 
policies on the ground. The Argentine case illustrates that 
free-market reforms could be adopted because they were 
congruent with urgent local problems. Reforms were not 
articulated as self-justifying goals, but as the “only possible” 
means of achieving stabilization and growth. 
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As other authors have already stressed (Biglaiser, 
2009; Neiburg, 2006), the international components be-
came a part of economic policy in Argentina through the 
training of high state officials and due to the extension of 
the expert circles involved in the decision-making process. 
But foreign components were not only present in econ-
omists’ training and networks; opportunities available at 
the international level, inspiration from foreign models, 
imported price references, the interests of concerned par-
ties, conditions imposed by institutional mediators, and 
the local effects of the fates of competing countries were 
all external ingredients of local policy. Nevertheless, in the 
implementation of convertibility, public officials acted in 
pragmatic and creative ways to develop policy solutions 
even against the original advice of their foreign partners. 
Concretely, the participation of Argentine poli-
ticians and economists was reflected in three facts: first, 
the implementation of convertibility as an instrument for 
curbing inflation, despite the fact that it was considered 
an outdated exchange arrangement, and the rejection of 
the Washington Consensus’ recommendation of adopt-
ing a floating exchange arrangement with a devalued 
real exchange rate. Second, Argentinian convertibility 
included several unorthodox features that allowed the 
Central Bank some room for maneuver on monetary and 
exchange rate policy. Finally, their immediate achieve-
ment enabled a change of tone in the IMF and the 
international community from prudence and skepticism 
to final approval and celebration of the convertibility 
regime from its initial adoption to the Mexican crisis. 
Argentine convertibility was far from being a hand-
me-down recipe from the IMF master chef. It was the 
product of local innovation, which went through a dra-
matic arc of international discussion and questioning to 
close monitoring and, later, promoted to the status of a 
recommended international economic policy.
The position of foreign officials was far from being 
unified in favor of the Argentinian plan. In fact, in the 
early 1990s most members of the IMF board criticized the 
adoption of the Argentinian currency board. It was only 
after its stabilizing effects and in the light of the Mexican 
crises that they recognized and celebrated the virtues of 
Cavallo’s strategy. The reasons were not only technical: 
countries represented in the IMF board, such as Spain and 
Italy, had economic motivations since they defended the 
high profitability in dollars of their companies based in 
Argentina. Nevertheless, even if they were in a minority 
position, critics remained active throughout the period, 
and foreign officials’ arguments anticipated most of the 
limits of the Argentinian choice. 
Argentinian innovation and its later international 
endorsement can hardly be considered a story of success. 
While the global community celebrated the Argentinian 
case and encouraged other countries to follow its path, 
many indicators confirmed the early warnings. As the 
heterodox economists had foreseen, there was a severe 
increase of unemployment, poverty, and social inequality. 
As orthodox economists had alerted, public and private 
indebtedness grew dramatically and ended up weaken-
ing the confidence of financial markets. Trapped in its 
achievement, Argentina could only decide to abandon 
its currency board after the most dramatic and full-scale 
crises of its history. 
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